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The Complexities of Narcoviolencia: 
Understanding the Mexican Drug Con!ict as a Market of Violence
Introduction
Since 2006, Mexico has been gripped by violence re-
lated to the trade in illegal drugs, thanks to its posi-
tion between the drug producers of Central and South 
America and the world’s largest recreational narcotics 
market, the United States of America. While it is impos-
sible to accurately count the victims of this conflict, re-
ports indicate that the death toll so far is approaching 
50,000 (Fantz 2012). The overall scale of the violence is 
matched by its complexity—there are, as of this writ-
ing, at least seven major drug trafficking organizations 
(DTOs) involved, along with countless smaller ones1 –
and its brutality. But, strikingly, this is a conflict defined 
as much by what it lacks as by what it includes, and 
what it lacks is a clear political agenda on the part of 
almost all of the combatants. The absence of such an 
1 Although for obvious reasons it is impossible to accu-
rately rank the power of the various cartels relative to each other, it 
is generally accepted that the most powerful trafficking organiza-
tions as of this writing are the Gulf Cartel, the Sinaloa Cartel (aka La 
Linea), the Juarez Cartel, La Familia Michoacana, Los Zetas, the Bel-
tran Leyva Organization and the Arellano Felix Organization (Fantz, 
2012).
agenda increases the difficulty of understanding the 
conflict through the traditional tools of strategic or 
political analysis, such as theories of insurgency and 
counterinsurgency;2  but at the same time, the scale of 
the violence makes it difficult to understand through 
analytical tools designed for smaller-scale incidences of 
crime or violence, such as those provided by criminol-
ogy. The difficulties in understanding the conflict mir-
ror, in some ways, the difficulties that the Mexican and 
American governments have encountered in formulat-
ing policies that can effectively manage it—the milita-
rised strategy pursued by the Calderón administration 
(and more or less supported by the Bush and Obama 
administrations on the American side) has not led to a 
decrease either in violence or in the availability of drugs 
in the United States, but at the same time the level of 
violence in certain parts of Mexico is too great for tradi-
tional policing strategies to be employed.
More contemporarily, some writers (Sullivan 2001; Ar-
quilla & Ronfeldt 2001) have applied network theory to 
2 Contemporary thinking on counterinsurgency is prob-
ably best summed up by the US Army and Marine Corps joint Field 
Manual on Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24.
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Abstract
This article examines the categorisation and definition of the drug-linked violence which has affected Mexico since 2006. 
Academic and policy approaches to this conflict have largely been grouped into defining the violence as either an inci-
dence of irregular warfare, or as a particularly virulent strain of organized crime. Arguing that these models both obscure 
important aspects of the situation in Mexico, and that even the applications of network theory to conflict do not account 
for the resilience and scope of the conflict in Mexico. Instead, this article suggests the idea of a “market of violence” defined 
by a large number of groups competing for resources and bordered by a series of external constraints is the most accurate 
framework for assessing the conflict. Having presented this idea, the article concludes by assessing how changes in the 
constraints of this market could undercut the rationale for drug-linked violence in Mexico.
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irregular conflicts. While helpful in understanding that 
the structures of individual drug trafficking organiza-
tions are not necessarily hierarchical, making them 
more resistant to disruption by the arrest or killing of 
their leadership, these theories have generally been ap-
plied to groups which share a purpose. The situation in 
Mexico is more complex, involving a large number of 
separate groups whose relationships with each other 
are highly fluid and range from full cooperation to ex-
tremely violent competition, with profit as the only ap-
parent common interest between them.
Given those difficulties, there is a clear need to explore 
alternative means of understanding this conflict. This 
article proposes one such approach: viewing the con-
flict as an example of a “market of violence” which ex-
ists within a specific set of constraints imposed partly 
by the particular geographical, political and economic 
situation in Mexico and partly by the structure of the 
international narcotics control system and the dynam-
ics of globalisation as applied to a completely illegiti-
mate market. A market of violence is a conflict driven 
by its economic origins; actors within the market are 
not bound by common interest beyond their shared 
desire for profit, whose character is further defined not 
by the individual strategy or tactics of any individual 
participant, but by a set of external constraints beyond 
their power to alter. It is a flexible framework which ac-
counts for the co-existence of complex interactions be-
tween a wide variety of violent actors. Viewing violence 
in Mexico in this fashion also changes its comparative 
set: instead of approaching it as a type of warfare abet-
ted by profits from the sale of narcotics, as in Colombia 
or Peru in the 1980s, the market model argues that the 
contemporary situation in Mexico is more comparable 
to Russia following the fall of Communism or Sicily in 
the heyday of the Mafia.
This article illustrates how this conflict has been perpet-
uated by a system of constraints and interests have giv-
en rise to a persistent conflict, rather than the particular 
strategy or interest of any one organization or group. In 
other words, instead of analysing how individual DTOs 
are organized, this article posits that the overall struc-
ture of global drug trafficking and the Mexican state 
have created a persistent marketplace for drugs and 
drug-trafficking services in which the chief regulating 
factor is the provision of violence. 
The first section briefly outlines the history of the cur-
rent drug conflict in Mexico, starting with Mexico’s 
emergence as a major drug transit state in the 1970s 
and 80s, when the state and its drug traffickers coex-
isted relatively peacefully, through the end of PRI rule 
in 2000 and the beginning of the current drug conflict 
at the beginning of President Felipe Calderón’s term in 
2006. It briefly describes the different tactics employed 
by some of the more prominent drug trafficking groups 
and examines the role of the United States, both direct-
ly and indirectly, in the conflict.
The second section briefly examines the constraints 
which define the conflict, divided roughly into two 
sections, external and internal constraints. The external 
constraints comprise the structure of the globalised 
drug trafficking system, including the effects of the pro-
hibition system and the bifurcation between wealthy 
drug-consumption states and poor, fragile drug-pro-
duction states. The internal constraints in Mexico in-
clude the weaknesses of its law enforcement agencies, 
security services, and judiciary, and its geographic ad-
vantages as a transit state for the world’s largest con-
sumer of narcotics, the United States.
The third section outlines the nature of a marketplace 
of violence as it exists in Mexico. Starting with the limi-
tations of “netwar” and similar applications of network 
theory to explain complex conflicts, it demonstrates 
how given favourable local conditions, an appropriate 
resource, and a global system which links economies 
without providing equality of opportunity can create a 
marketplace regulated by apparently extreme violence 
can persist, even with high turnover amongst partici-
pants. 
The final section of the article proposes four ways in 
which the conditions of the marketplace could change, 
leading to a return to lower, pre-2006 levels of violence. 
It considers the extremely unlikely eventualities of a 
complete paradigm shift in the border economy, either 
by means of shutting or fortifying the border or by le-
galising drugs; as well as the relatively unlikely possibil-
ity of a resumption of the pre-2000 cooperative truce 
between drug traffickers and the Mexican state. Finally, 
it considers the longer-term but more feasible alterna-
tives: a cultural shift against trafficking violence which 
limits the courses of action available to drug traffickers, 
or a massive program of institution-building to enable 
the Mexican state to raise the penalties for violence to 
a point where it is no longer the best regulator of this 
market. While these are imperfect solutions which will 
be slow to implement and are better-suited for manag-
ing the violence rather than permanently defeating all 
current or possible drug trafficking organizations, they 
are the best approaches to a conflict which has been 
persistently mischaracterised and misunderstood.
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A Con!ict without a Name: 
Drug War in Mexico, 2006-Present
There is little agreement on the nature of violence in 
Mexico; but even more fundamentally, no one seems 
to agree on how to call it. The general term in areas af-
fected is simply narcoviolencia, or drug violence (Vuil-
lamy 2010), but that term is too general to be of much 
use either analytically or prescriptively. The Mexican 
government seems to prefer to call it a “fight” or “battle” 
against organized crime (Poiré 2011); the US Secretary 
of State at one point called it an “insurgency” but had to 
withdraw her comments in the face of Mexican anger 
(Carroll 2010); and of course, the United States has used 
the overarching metaphor of a “war against drugs” since 
1971.3  Yet none of these seem to adequately encom-
pass the dimensions of the conflict. Using politically-
charged words like “war” and “insurgency” implies that 
the cartels have political goals, like Mexican versions of 
the Taliban or the Viet Cong. But while there are a few 
limited exceptions, they simply do not have political or 
ideological motives in the way that classical insurgen-
cies do (Finnegan 2010).4  At the same time, depoliticis-
ing the violence and arguing that the various non-state 
participants are simply gangs engaged in violent crimi-
nal activities underplays their level of sophistication and 
ability to challenge the state’s monopoly on force in the 
largest and richest Spanish-speaking country in the 
world. I use the term “conflict” to describe the violence 
in question, since it is relatively neutral with respect to 
the political and ideological content of the violence.
What is relatively uncontested is that the current incar-
nation of the violence dates roughly to the election of 
current president Felipe Calderón in late 2006. Its roots, 
however, go back farther than that. Mexico has long 
been a “trading partner” of sorts for illicit goods bound 
for the United States, and the endemic corruption un-
der the Partido de Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), 
which ruled the country from 1930 until 2000 allowed 
this to continue largely unchecked. Under the PRI, the 
3 Although this terminology was quietly withdrawn by the 
Obama Administration in 2009, the rhetorical shift was not accom-
panied by any significant change in counter-narcotics policy from 
its predecessors.
4 The primary exception being La Familia Michoacana 
(LFM), which claims a pseudo-Christian ideology and operates 
public services in its home state of Michoacan, in the traditional 
model of an insurgency. However, LFM has been substantially 
weakened by its rivals and by raids on its leadership by the Mexi-
can government, and its future is highly uncertain.
drug cartels formed what has been described as a “state-
sponsored protection racket”, whereby corruption at 
high levels in the Mexican security and justice appara-
tus allowed drug traffickers to go about their business 
relatively unmolested (Snyder & Duran-Martinez 2009: 
253-273). Another way of conceptualising this arrange-
ment is that the PRI and the cartels made an informal 
agreement: the cartels would be free to do their busi-
ness so long as they kept a limit on the amount of vio-
lence they perpetrated (Andreas 1998: 163).
This persisted until roughly the 1980s, when the dy-
namics of the trafficking business began to change. 
Although it produces a moderate amount of heroin 
and marijuana, Mexico has never been a world-class 
drug supplier in the vein of Colombia or Afghanistan 
(UNODC 2011). However, during the “cocaine cowboys” 
era of the 1980s, when Colombian and Cuban traffick-
ing groups were the primary actors bringing marijuana 
and cocaine to market in the United States—and fre-
quently fighting violent turf battles around Miami and 
South Florida—the American government stepped up 
interdiction efforts in the Caribbean, which cut deeply 
into the profit margins of groups which relied on that 
route. Seeking more direct access to the US market, the 
Colombian cartels approached Mexican smugglers and 
offered them a cut of the profits to move their goods 
into the United States across the land border. This bor-
der, 1969 miles long and largely marked by inhospitable 
deserts and mountains, is extremely difficult to patrol or 
secure effectively. With a steady supply of drugs from 
the south and a seizure rate going north insufficient 
to negatively affect the traffickers’ profit margin,5  the 
Mexican cartels racked up massive profits and quickly 
grew (Feiling 2009: 134-137).
However, when the PRI lost the 2000 presidential elec-
tions, its fragile peace with the drug traffickers fell 
apart. The new government, headed by the Partido 
Acción Nacional (PAN)’s Vicente Fox, decentralised and 
began to reform the PRI’s justice system, which dis-
rupted many of the relationships the cartels had built 
up over the preceding decades and deprived them 
of their state support (Snyder & Duran-Martinez 2009: 
267). This process was accelerated following the 2006 
elections, which the PAN’s Felipe Calderón won under 
controversial circumstances by a mere fraction of a 
5 The 2011 National Drug Threat Assessment indicated that 
while disruptions in the cocaine market (some from law enforce-
ment interdiction efforts, some from infighting and other effects) 
had kept cocaine availability levels below 2007 levels, but that 
overall, availability of illicit drugs has been increasing in the United 
States.
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percentage point (McKinley 2006). Calderón ordered a 
show of force: the deployment of units of the Mexican 
Army and detachments from the Policia Federale6  to 
his home state of Michoacan to confront drug traffick-
ing activity there.7  Shortly thereafter, his administration 
widened the deployment, sending troops to the coun-
try’s border with the United States, which is the focal 
point of the smuggling. Over the first few months of 
this strategy, the government could point to some ma-
jor seizures of narcotics and arrests of mid- and high-
level traffickers as signs that the strategy was successful. 
However, by mid-2007, the murder rate was on the rise 
again and cartels were adopting new and more violent 
tactics (Killebrew & Bernal-Garcia 2010). To deal with the 
changing security situation, the Cartel del Golfo (the 
Gulf Cartel, or CdG, based on Mexico’s eastern coast, 
which had been one of the largest and wealthiest car-
tels prior to 2006), encouraged members of the Mexi-
can Army’s special forces to desert, and formed them 
into an “armed wing” which came to be known as Los 
Zetas (Campbell 2011: 56). The Zetas, however, soon re-
alised that their potential profits were limited by being 
subordinates in a larger organization, and subsequently 
declared independence from the CdG. 
The total number of deaths related to the drug trade 
steadily increased from 2006, with 2221 that year in-
creasing to 2561 in 2007, and a figure somewhere be-
tween 5620 and 6756 in 2008 (Williams 2009: 3). The 
approximate doubling of fatalities between 2007 and 
2008 was troubling enough on its own, but it was ac-
companied by evidence that this was not simply a tem-
porary surge of violence. Instead of avoiding conflict 
with the Mexican armed forces—which are, in contrast 
to the state and local police forces, generally profes-
sional, capable and well-equipped—the narcotrafi-
cantes were fighting back, assassinating leading politi-
cal and law-enforcement figures (Williams 2009: 2) and 
using increasingly powerful military hardware (includ-
ing modern body armour, encrypted communications 
gear, armoured vehicles, explosives and military-style 
assault and sniper rifles) to fight it out with security forc-
6 This agency has been subsequently reformed and re-
named the Federal Preventative Police, but remains Mexico’s pre-
mier paramilitary police force.
7 Unlike many of the other most-affected areas in the drug 
war, Michoacan is not desirable to traffickers for its proximity to 
the United States. Rather, it is a mountainous, rural area on the 
country’s southern Pacific coast, which means that it is ideally situ-
ated for both drug production and as a quiet area in which nau-
tical shipments of drugs from South American producers can be 
received.
es, and with each other (Ellingwood & Wilkinson 2011). 
In response, the United States began to take a more ac-
tive role in the conflict. In 2009, the United States and 
Mexico signed a foreign aid agreement called the Mé-
rida Initiative, under which the United States promised 
USD 1.4 billion in security assistance.8  This plan was 
largely based on the American assistance package for 
Colombia agreed to under President Bill Clinton and 
largely put into effect under the Bush Administration 
(Brands 2009: 33). The older assistance package, called 
Plan Colombia, has been credited with giving the Co-
lombian military the necessary means to drive the FARC 
and ELN rebels into the southern jungles and securing 
the country’s major urban areas—although, notably, 
it failed to noticeably reduce the quantity of cocaine 
exports (International Crisis Group 2008: 1), while the 
Colombian military has come in for significant criticism 
regarding its human rights practices in putting it into 
effect (Isacson 2010: 5).
Whatever the successes are of Plan Colombia, they 
have not yet been replicated in Mexico. The drug-linked 
murder rate there has increased each year since 2006, 
despite the arrest of a respectable number of high-level 
drug traffickers and the deaths of various others, at the 
hands of both the state and their rivals. This undercuts 
the theory that “decapitating” the cartels by killing or 
arresting their leadership would be in and of itself suf-
ficient to control the violence. Proponents of the de-
capitation strategy often base their argument upon the 
successful Colombian-American joint operations which 
brought down the Cali and Medellin cartels in Colom-
bia (Bonner 2010: 43), but this ignores the fact that the 
hierarchical Cali and Medellin cartels represented an 
organizational anomaly amongst Colombian drug traf-
ficking organizations (Kenney 2009). Additionally, the 
situations in Colombia in the late 1980s/early 1990s and 
today’s Mexico are different in hugely substantial ways: 
the Colombian government faced an active and well-
organized political insurgency in addition to drug traf-
fickers, and Colombia is a production rather than transit 
site for drugs, which changes the dynamics of counter-
narcotics operations considerably. 
Moreover, in Mexico, the easy availability of high-
powered weapons just across the border in the Unit-
ed States has meant that gunmen in the employ of 
DTOs can often win fights with the poorly-equipped 
8 While the appropriation for the Initiative was USD 1.4 bil-
lion, distribution of the funds since its signing has been slow: in 
July, 2010, the Government Accountability Office found that only 
9% of the funds have actually been expended (GAO 2010).
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local and municipal police forces, and even stand up 
against assaults by the military. Internal politics in the 
United States make restricting gun sales difficult; and a 
recent attempt by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
Firearms (ATF) to track gun sales into Mexico ended in 
scandal when it was revealed that the ATF had know-
ingly allowed agents of DTOs to purchase hundreds of 
assault weapons and bring them south across the bor-
der, where they were used in various murders and at-
tacks (Horwitz 2011).
As of this writing, there appears to be no end in sight 
to the conflict. There is no central figure in the Mexican 
drug trafficking community who can be killed, arrest-
ed, co-opted, or negotiated with—the most powerful 
trafficker in the country is probably Joaquim “El Chapo” 
(“Shorty”) Guzman, head of the Sinaloa cartel, but given 
that even his cartel does not control a majority or plu-
rality share of the drug trade (Bunker 2011: 11), it is ex-
traordinarily unlikely that any feasible combination of 
arrests or killings could undo the rationale for violence 
and bring the violence down to its pre-2006 levels. 
Constraints on Con!ict in Mexico
There are two basic sets of constraints which control 
the shape and type of violence in Mexico. The first is the 
series of interlocking structures which compose the in-
ternational narcotics market and the international nar-
cotics prohibition system, and the second is Mexico’s 
geography and geopolitical situation. 
I will begin with the composition of the system by which 
narcotics are distributed and controlled. Unlike many 
other “conflict resources” (such as timber, diamonds or 
oil), drugs are universally prohibited—they cannot be 
laundered or otherwise moved into a legitimate mar-
ket.9  In other words, the means by which drugs are pro-
duced and brought to market are entirely outside the 
control of any kind of legitimate authority. As a result, in 
drug markets, the only means of contract enforcement 
is violence, either explicit or implicit (Reuter 2009: 75). 
This is not to say that all drug markets are inherently 
violent,10  but compared to legitimate or even semi-le-
gitimate markets, they operate under a different set of 
9 This is largely a result of the 1961 UN Single Convention 
on Narcotic Drugs, although a variety of other international legal 
statutes apply as well. While a few countries (famously, the Nether-
lands, although to varying degrees in other places) have decrimi-
nalised drugs, their production, distribution and use are crimes 
virtually everywhere.
10 The production of marijuana in Northern California and 
British Columbia takes place with little to no violence, for example.
rules—and the behaviour of actors in those markets is 
correspondingly different.
The drug market is also predicated upon two other fac-
tors: a huge disparity between the price of production 
and what users will pay for those products, and a rela-
tively constant level of demand. The price disparity has 
been increased by the globalisation of the drugs trade. 
With borders opened by free trade and a vast amount 
of goods moving relatively unsupervised between 
countries, it has become common for drug traffickers 
to site production in countries where labour costs are 
low and the local security services are poorly equipped, 
easily corruptible or otherwise incapable of exercising 
complete control over their territory, and then to sell 
the drugs for an exponentially higher price in rich coun-
tries where large-scale production would be unfeasible. 
Meanwhile, fifty years of complete global drug prohibi-
tion have not put a damper on demand. The reasons for 
this are complex, controversial and beyond the scope 
of this article. However, even contemporary US govern-
ment sources suggest that 40 years since Richard Nixon 
declared that drug abuse would be defeated, the threat 
from drug trafficking is increasing rather than decreas-
ing (US Department of Justice 2010). Admissions such 
as this, given the historical failures of similar initiatives 
such as Prohibition, demonstrate that while govern-
ments can influence the global illicit drug market on 
the margins, its existence and basic functions are be-
yond state control.
In short, any conflict in which drug trafficking play a role 
exists within a larger system which provides substantial 
resources to traffickers. These dynamics are particularly 
strong in Mexico, which also has specific geographi-
cal, political and economic factors that contribute to 
its vulnerability to persistent, drug-linked conflict. The 
geographical factors include its lengthy land border 
with the United States, its long coastlines (ideal for sea-
borne bulk shipments of narcotics to be delivered sur-
reptitiously), its relative proximity to the world’s leading 
cocaine producers (Colombia, Bolivia and Peru) and its 
sheer size. The political factors include an often-frac-
tious system of government with substantial corruption 
problems (Lupsha 1991: 41-58) and a relationship with 
the United States freighted with historical grievances 
and mutual mistrust (Deare 2009), while the contribu-
tory economic issues include a large population with 
substantial levels of economic inequality and poverty, 
which means that drug trafficking organizations have a 
large number of potential recruits with few other profit-
able alternatives available to them. Even in the absence 
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of a political insurgency,11  these factors have combined 
to create a “perfect storm” of drug violence. 
Understanding Violent Markets: 
“A Thousand Little Wars”
As with the combination of factors which create a ma-
jor storm, the state of violence which afflicts Mexico is 
complex and multifaceted.  One of the most important 
aspects of this type of violence is its decentralisation. 
This is a critical concept for understanding the persis-
tence of violence in Mexico, but it requires some expla-
nation. It is closely related to the concept of networking, 
which, broadly speaking, holds that social, political and 
economic phenomena can be explained by mapping 
the relationships between individuals or groups (usu-
ally referred to as “nodes”). Network theory has been 
applied to a wide variety of subjects in both the natural 
and social sciences (Freeman 2004), but this article is 
concerned with its application to conflict. There have 
been various attempts to explain decentralisation and 
networking as organizational concepts for particular 
violent groups; perhaps most widely known amongst 
these is the concept of “Netwar” promulgated by John 
Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (2001). This theory holds 
that forces in opposition to the state, whether “dark” 
groups of terrorists, drug smugglers and revolutionar-
ies or “light” groups of civil society activists, are evolv-
ing towards a networked form of organization, which 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt dub the “all-channel network”, in 
which every node can connect with every other node 
to maximise information-sharing, responsiveness and 
resiliency. Netwar is a useful step away from thinking 
of drug gangs as simply dark mirror images of militar-
ies or law enforcement agencies. It posits that gangs 
are structured in a variety of different ways. Organiza-
tional structures may range from hierarchical groups 
with clearly defined leadership positions and a straight-
forward chain of command to “hub” networks centred 
around those who have the most connections to other 
members of the network. In order to minimise the po-
tential damage from infiltration by law enforcement, 
more sophisticated organizational structures often 
11 The one political insurgency of note in Mexico is the Za-
patista movement, based in the Yucatan peninsula, which advo-
cates against free trade, and for greater rights for labor unions and 
indigenous people. They fought a brief series of battles with the 
government in 1994, and have pursued their goals through largely 
peaceable means ever since. However, they have never been in-
volved with drug trafficking.
manifest themselves as “chain” networks in which each 
node (an individual or sub-group) only has contact with 
their neighbours.12  
This typology explains how DTOs frequently survive be-
yond the capture or killing of their leading figures. In the 
last five years, the Mexican government has announced 
the arrests or killings of leadership figures from every 
major cartel operating in the country, with scant effect 
on the levels of violence or drug availability (Depart-
ment of Justice 2010). There are a few examples of vio-
lent cartels which have been successfully decapitated; 
most frequently cited are the cases of the Cali and Me-
dellin cartels of Colombia, which amassed enormous 
power and wealth in the 1980s and early 1990s, only to 
be brought down by a joint Colombian-American effort 
to eliminate their leaders, which most famously result-
ed in the killing of Pablo Escobar. Yet as Michael Kenney 
has ably demonstrated, this is not prima facie evidence 
that decapitation would work against any given DTO, 
for several reasons. First, the Cali and Medellin cartels 
were exceptional in their degree of centralisation and 
their willingness to challenge the central authority of 
the state (which included collaboration with political 
insurgents and assassinations of high-ranking govern-
ment officials). Most DTOs in Colombia and elsewhere 
have assumed very different forms. Secondly, while the 
hierarchies of the two cartels were destroyed along 
with the infrastructure which supported that very high 
level of state challenge, the underlying drug trafficking 
network continued to exist (Kenney 2009: 99), and the 
total amount of cocaine being produced and exported 
did not noticeably change (International Crisis Group 
2008). What had happened was that the circumstances 
made the large, hierarchical super-cartels obsolete, and 
they were replaced by (or to some degree, evolved into) 
smaller, more loosely organized drug trafficking groups. 
These groups are less able to directly challenge the 
state in the way that the super-cartels were, but they 
are still capable of significant levels of both violence 
and innovation—the proliferation of semi-submersible 
“narco-submarines” since 2005 serving as evidence of 
the latter (Bühler 2010).
Neither the typology of criminal network forms nor 
their general ability to withstand trauma which would 
be fatal to a hierarchy are sufficient to explain the per-
sistence and scale of the violence in Mexico. Instead, 
12 I say this form is “specialised” because it is ideally suited to 
smuggling networks – each node represents one step of the jour-
ney (e.g.. those who produce the drug, those who process it, those 
who ship is across borders, and those who retail it to customers).
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what we have to understand is how these features, in 
the context of the constraints already discussed, sup-
port a market of violence. Netwar is a useful means of 
explaining how successful violent organizations can be 
arranged according to non-hierarchical patterns in or-
der to maximise resiliency, but it assumes a common 
purpose amongst the “nodes”. It is therefore limited in 
its application here to explaining the resilience of indi-
vidual drug trafficking organizations to the coercive ca-
pability of the state. The resilience of violence between 
a large and apparently growing number of disparate or-
ganizations not having a common purpose (aside from 
the accumulation of profit) requires a more nuanced 
explanation.
David Keen describes intractable conflicts elsewhere 
as “complex emergencies”, which instead of a battle to 
the end between opposed, vaguely symmetrical forc-
es, can actually serve to enhance prospects for certain 
type of economic activity. The production and traffick-
ing of drugs is a good example of this phenomenon, 
since a strong state will severely curtail profitable drug-
trafficking activities (Keen 2008: 26). This is a useful way 
of thinking about conflicts such as Mexico. Unlike in an 
insurgency, the drug gangs there are not seeking the 
overthrow of the state or even the breakaway of a spe-
cific region, as in an insurgency. Insurgency is not an 
applicable model for understanding networked con-
flict, since it refers to a specific variant on war in which 
relatively clearly defined groups contest a specific po-
litical objective, albeit through asymmetrical means. 
Herfried Münkler identifies symmetry as one of the 
defining characteristics which join conventional and 
unconventional warfare. By this, he does not mean 
symmetry between the means of the attackers, but 
between the ways they understand the conflict and 
its stakes—in other words, an asymmetry not only of 
means but of ends (Münkler 2005: 68). Drug violence is 
an excellent example of asymmetry between combat-
ants. For the state, public health and order are at stake; 
whereas for drug traffickers, violence serves as their sole 
means of contract enforcement and, to some extent, 
the means by which they support their livelihoods. The 
asymmetries grow even further when drug trafficking 
conflicts are put in a transnational context. For the rich, 
stable countries which serve as the demand engine for 
drugs, the interest is at stake is public health and the 
enforcement of laws which serve to regulate individual 
behaviour, and to a small extent the maintenance of 
public order.  For the countries which host the produc-
tion and trafficking aspects of the drugs trade, the loss 
of income and violence are more existential threats, 
and public health and behavioural standards are sub-
sequently deprioritised. As Nikos Passas points out, this 
tendency is exacerbated in countries undergoing sub-
stantial economic, social and political transitions—as in 
Mexico, with the combination of its new, NAFTA-based 
free trade relationship with the United States, and its 
political transition away from one-party rule by the PRI 
(Passas 2000). This is neatly exemplified by the con-
trast between drug and gun laws in the United States 
and Mexico. In the former, drug laws are stringent and 
strictly enforced while guns are widely and easily avail-
able, while in the latter, laws against drug possession 
are relatively mild whilst those against gun ownership 
are extremely strict. Münkler further observes that 
in asymmetrical conflicts, the distribution of costs is 
highly uneven: as the conventional tools of war have 
gotten exponentially more costly to purchase, main-
tain and use, the cost of waging unconventional war 
has stayed steady—or, in some cases, even declined 
(Münkler 2005: 92). This principle sees perhaps its clear-
est expression in drug violence, since drug traffickers 
make huge profits from their trade, while the state can-
not legitimately claim any benefit against its huge and 
increasing expenditure fighting them.
Of course, the drugs trade is not the only driving force 
which can generate sustained violence in a country not 
suffering from a politically or ideologically-motivated 
insurgency. As Phil Williams notes, the current outbreak 
of violence in Mexico can be roughly compared to 
the “Wild East” of 1990s Russia—a sharp rise of organ-
ized criminality in the decade following the collapse 
of the Soviet Union in the 1990s (Williams 2011: 223). 
In the post-Soviet Russia, as Vadim Volkov has demon-
strated, the resources contested were not a particular 
product, but rather control over large sections of the 
newly-privatised state economy. This led Volkov to dub 
the particular breed of post-Soviet organised criminals 
“violent entrepreneurs”, (Volkov 2002) which is an apt 
term for the combination of entrepreneurial attitude 
and willingness to use force. Understanding actors as 
having economic rather than political interests helps 
put violence that falls in between traditional concep-
tions of war and crime into a much more clear and 
comprehensive context. In a market without traditional 
enforcement or regulatory mechanisms, or any kind of 
recourse to a centralised authority, violence assumes a 
wide variety of purposes. It serves as a means of de-
fending or expanding a group’s spheres of influence, a 
medium of communication between groups that lack 
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established contacts with each other,13  or a way to 
demonstrate seriousness of purpose and commitment 
to a particular goal (or business, or region). 
In this way we can see the outlines of a market of vi-
olence which is not dependent for its perpetuation 
upon the success or even the survival of a particular 
individual or group. With a powerful economic driver 
such as the market for narcotics or the sudden and 
wholesale privatisation of an entire national economy, 
and given some (not necessarily vast) degree of state 
weakness or dysfunction, a dynamic can emerge, in 
which the provision of violence can be bought, sold, 
or bartered like any other product. John Robb, refer-
ring to the proliferation of loosely-affiliated actors who 
composed the Iraqi insurgency, used the phrase a “ba-
zaar of violence” (Robb 2007: 15). The conception of a 
“market of violence” as used here is similar, although in 
Robb’s conception the provision of violence was simply 
the product being offered. In a market such as Mexico, 
absent the ideological and religious differences of Iraq, 
and without an occupying foreign force to provide an 
overarching political goal for violent actors, violence 
can certainly be a product, but it is also, critically, the 
means by which disputes are resolved and contracts 
are enforced. It is, in other words, a service as well as 
a product. It also serves a regulatory purpose: Within 
such a context, acts of violence which may appear to an 
outside observer to be random and meaningless are, in 
fact, the operating currency of the market, and serve 
to regulate its functions within the external constraints. 
As long as the level of violence does not breach those 
constraints,14  the system will continue generating prof-
its and violence apace with little regard for which indi-
viduals and groups are taking part. 
The market of violence, in other words, is a flexible 
conception which explains the persistence of violence 
even as the number of actors and individual agendas 
increase rapidly. Instead of trying to fit a conflict with a 
multitude of individual participants who share no com-
mon agenda into a basically bilateral model such as war 
or organized crime, conceptualising Mexico as a market 
13 This is true in a particularly direct and brutal fashion in 
Mexico, where a variety of different DTOs have adopted “corpse 
messaging” (leaving dead bodies with warnings or messages writ-
ten on them in public places) as a communications tool.
14 Williams (2010) compares violence in Mexico to the con-
flict between the Sicilian Mafia and the contemporary Italian state, 
and describes such an act of violence which breached one of the 
constraints: the 1992 assassination of popular anti-Mafia judge 
Giovanni Falcone, which mobilised public opinion against the Ma-
fia and undercut their draw on the sympathy of the public.
of violence explains the persistence of violence there, 
and furthermore, allows us to examine what changes 
might lead to its end.
Approaches to the Marketplace 
of Violence in Mexico
The self-reinforcing dynamics of the market of vio-
lence can clearly be seen at work in Mexico. Although 
the country is not in the first rank of narcotics produc-
ers worldwide, its border with the United States—the 
world’s leading narcotics consumer—has become an 
incredibly valuable piece of real estate for drug traffick-
ers. Furthermore, the regulations imposed by the NAF-
TA mean that crossing the border with cargo—legiti-
mate or otherwise—is relatively easy; it is unfeasible for 
the US government to interrupt the economically vital 
border exchanges.15  This economic engine is also pow-
ered by the massive wealth disparity between those 
who pursue legitimate occupations (which, near the 
border, are largely limited to jobs in the border facto-
ries, called maquiladoras, where wages total only a few 
dollars a day) and the comparatively vast riches await-
ing those who enlist with a drug gang (Rice 2011). Put 
simply, the dynamics of the border economy help cre-
ate the constraints under which a system of complex, 
persistent violence can come to pass.
Next, the conditions created by the Mexican govern-
ment—including its fractious relationship with the US 
government—have also contributed to the violence. 
The breakdown of the traditional system of patronage 
between the Mexican state and the cartels which ac-
companied the transition from PRI to PAN rule around 
the turn of the century compelled DTOs to turn to more 
violent measures to secure market share. This process 
was accelerated when Felipe Calderón’s administration 
sent the paramilitary federal police and the military it-
self after the cartels starting in 2006—with no serious 
remaining prospect of resuming the semi-collaborative 
relationship they enjoyed with the PRI government, the 
DTOs were left with little choice but to maximize their 
use of violence to protect their market share against 
the state.
Finally, the structure of the cartels themselves supports 
this type of conflict. With a large number of major car-
15 To give a sense of the scale, the estimated value of le-
gitimate cross border-trade in 2010 was USD 71 billion, just be-
tween the cities of Juarez and El Paso. See http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/07/31/magazine/life-on-the-line-between-el-paso-
and-juarez.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all.
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tels and an even larger array of sub-units and smaller 
gangs, the Mexican state could not focus its attention 
on one particular gang or region without leaving the 
others relatively unmolested. Furthermore, as predicted 
by the proponents of the netwar theory, Mexican drug 
gangs have adapted a number of different organiza-
tional and operational characteristics. As examples, Los 
Zetas tend to much more mercenary and use fear as 
a population control technique (Campbell 2011), while 
La Familia Michoacana built up a social service network 
and alternative forms of governance in its home ter-
ritory, becoming the closest thing the conflict has to 
a traditional insurgency (Finnegan 2010). This broad 
spectrum further complicates matters for the govern-
ment, as a strategy likely to be effective against a group 
organized to maximise violence and intimidation is un-
likely to work against one organized in such a way as to 
maintain support amongst the population. One size, in 
Mexico, will not fit all.
Given the organizational diversity of drug trafficking 
organizations and their substantial resources, the Mexi-
can government cannot win the conflict by simply at-
tacking them piecemeal and hoping the rate of attrition 
outstrips their rate of replacement, as it has been doing. 
The current approach can perhaps best be described as 
a conflict management strategy. The large and relative-
ly competent Mexican military and security forces are 
perfectly capable of maintaining the state’s monopoly 
on violence in most of the country and preventing the 
emergence of a super-cartel powerful enough to chal-
lenge its authority (which in any event would never be 
tolerated by the United States). However, until the con-
straints which have created this network of violence 
are fundamentally changed, there will continue to be a 
high level of bloodshed in areas along the border and 
major trafficking routes, with a substantial attendant 
cost in lives, treasure and credibility. In the abstract, 
there are four basic ways that this violent marketplace 
could be undermined.
First, the external constraints could be changed at a 
fundamental level. This would require one of two al-
ternatives: the closing of the US-Mexican border and/
or the repeal of NAFTA, or the legalisation of drugs. I 
group these two together because they are both 
equally unlikely to come to pass in the foreseeable fu-
ture. The immediate economic damage from closing 
the border would be so severe as to effectively rule out 
the first option, never mind the extremely high direct 
costs of fortifying the border to the extent that it would 
no longer be economically feasible to transport drugs 
across it. Drug legalisation is often mentioned as a way 
to undercut the rationale for violence, but aside from 
the extreme difficulty in overturning a long-established 
and universal international norm, it is no panacea. Drug 
trafficking organizations are unlikely to simply allow le-
gitimate businesses to supplant them, and in any case, 
the potential for conflict over a resource is not neces-
sarily tied to its illegality (Andreas & Wallman 2009: 228). 
It may be that changing social norms will make legalisa-
tion increasingly likely at some point in the future, but 
for the moment, it seems to be a dim prospect.
Secondly, a deal could be struck with drug traffickers, 
similar to the one which existed under the PRI. The traf-
fickers would be more or less left alone to sell drugs 
provided that they did so without engaging in vio-
lence. This is nearly as unlikely as the border-closing or 
legalisation scenarios, for a variety of reasons. First, Cal-
derón’s government cannot accept this state of affairs, 
as it would be an admission of failure in its signature 
security policy. And although Calderón himself is in-
eligible for re-election, it is unlikely that the machinery 
of the PAN would endorse a candidate who intended 
to reverse Calderón’s signature national security poli-
cies. Alternately, if a different party (most likely the PRI) 
were to win, the United States would continue to put 
strong pressure on the Mexican government to avoid 
this approach. Finally, the drug traffickers themselves 
are unlikely to agree to such an arrangement – with 
no central authority amongst them, there is no one for 
the government to negotiate with, which means either 
the government would have to effectively ally itself 
with one group and help it destroy its competition (a 
morally suspect policy, and one which would be ve-
hemently opposed by the United States), or get every 
major cartel to agree to a plan. Although it is possible 
that corruption in the Mexican security and justice sys-
tems could lead to some variant on this outcome, it is 
extremely difficult to imagine the country’s leadership 
taking this path intentionally, and without the leader-
ship’s involvement it would be extremely difficult for a 
truce to become the standard nationwide.
Third, a change in the cultural context could undercut 
the rationale for drug-related violence. While in most 
regards the comparison between networked violence 
in Mexico to insurgency is invalid, neither occurs in a 
vacuum. Drug traffickers, particularly those groups 
such as the Zetas which have elected to pursue a maxi-
mally violent strategy of intimidation, may not require 
public support in the same fashion as a traditional in-
surgency, but they require a certain amount of public 
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tolerance nonetheless, largely for a steady stream of re-
cruits necessary for expansion and to compensate for 
attrition. There is the beginning of a popular anti-vio-
lence movement in Mexico right now (BBC News 2011), 
but given the relatively low amount of popular support 
DTOs need to maintain the capability to do violence, 
and the variety of ways this support can be coerced, 
a cultural shift against drug-trafficking would have to 
be either epochal or combined with changes in other 
constraints.
Finally, a massive program of institution-building could 
undercut the economic rationale for drug violence. This 
would entail raising the cost of drug trafficking through 
the creation of more effective security services backed 
up by a more effective justice system (at the moment, 
the conviction rate for drug murders in Mexico remains 
under 4%) (Manwaring 2009: 22), and simultaneously 
creating more feasible alternatives to drug trafficking 
for potential cartel recruits by means of massive eco-
nomic investment. Although expensive, this is prob-
ably the most feasible of the available alternatives, and 
combined with a change in cultural attitudes, the most 
likely to bring about a real reduction in harm from the 
drug trade. While the Mérida Initiative is theoretically 
a step towards this strategy, accompanied by initia-
tives such as the Mexican government’s “Todos Somos 
Juarez” (“We are all Juarez”) civil-society programs, the 
lack of a clear strategy for institution-building on the 
part of either government demonstrates that this type 
of change will not occur overnight, either (GAO 2010: 18).
Conclusion
Markets of violence are incredibly resilient and difficult 
to break down. They cannot be negotiated with in a tra-
ditional fashion, nor can they be appeased or defeated 
through traditional military means. Since the profit mo-
tive remains, and the relatively short life expectancy of 
drug traffickers has not demonstrated a clear deterrent 
effect upon recruitment, simply increasing the number 
of traffickers captured or killed is unlikely to have any-
thing more than a transient effect on violence, and in 
fact may lead to an increase, as formerly disciplined or-
ganizations break down amidst infighting and internal 
power struggles. Traditional anti-crime strategies are 
reliant upon this deterrent effect, while counterinsur-
gency strategies rely upon maintaining control of the 
“social terrain” of the population, which, even ignoring 
the significant human rights concerns of using the mili-
tary as a domestic peacekeeping agency, is virtually im-
possible without providing economic alternatives suffi-
cient to change the economic calculations of potential 
drug traffickers.
In other words, the conceptions used by American and 
Mexican policymakers to understand and respond to 
drug violence in Mexico are unnecessarily complicating 
and frustrating the task of implementing policies which 
take account of the structural differences between 
crime, war and markets of violence. By superimposing 
binary models onto a multifaceted conflict, it is likely 
that they are simply extending a bloody status quo. 
Notes on Contributor
Jacob Parakilas is a PhD Candidate in the Department 
of International Relations at LSE, writing a dissertation 
on drug violence in Mexico. Prior to arriving at LSE, he 
worked as a contractor for the United States Depart-
ment of Homeland Security, for the World Security Insti-
tute and for the Arms Control Association. He received 
an MLitt in Middle East and Central Asian Security Stud-
ies from the University of St Andrews in 2009, and a BA 
in International Relations from Hampshire College in 
2006.
Andreas, P. (1998). “The Political Economy of Narco-
Corruption in Mexico”, Current History, 97 (618), pp. 
160-165.
Andreas, P. and J. Wallman (2009). “Illicit Markets and 
Violence: What is the Relationship?” Crime, Law and 
Social Change, vol. 52, pp. 225-229.
Arquilla, J. and Ronfeldt, D. (2001). Networks and Net-
war: The Future of Crime, Terror and Militancy, Ar-
lington, RAND Institute.
BBC News (2011). “Mexico Anti-drug Convoy Crosses 
Border to Accuse US”, BBC. Available at: http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-13740588 
(Accessed: 29 July, 2011).
Bonner, R. C. (2010). “The New Cocaine Cowboys: How 
to Defeat Mexico’s Drug Cartels”, Foreign Affairs. 
Available at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/arti-
cles/66472/robert-c-bonner/the-new-cocaine-
cowboys (Accessed: 14 January, 2012). 
Brands, H. (2009). “Mexico’s Narco-Insurgency and US 
Counter-Drug Policy”, Strategic Studies Institute, 
SSI.  Available at: http://www.strategicstudiesinsti-
tute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=918 (Ac-
cessed: 14 January, 2012). 
REFERENCES
Interdisciplinary Political Studies
Vol.2, No. 1 Special issue, March 2012
©IdPS
46
ISSN 2039-8573 online
Bühler, A. (2010). “Former Drug Smuggler Tells His Sto-
ry: The Colombian Coke Sub”, Der Spiegel. Avail-
able at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/
world/0,1518,732292,00.html (Accessed: 14 Janu-
ary, 2012).
Bunker, R. J. (2011). “Strategic Threat: Narcos and Narcot-
ics Overview”, R.J. Bunker (ed.), Narcos Over the Bor-
der, New York, Routledge.
Campbell, L. J. (2011). “Los Zetas: Operational Assess-
ment”, in R.J. Bunker (ed.), Narcos Over the Border, 
New York, Routledge.
Carroll, R. (2010). “Hillary Clinton: Mexican Drugs War is 
Colombia-Style Insurgency”, The Guardian. Avail-
able at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/
sep/09/hillary-clinton-mexican-drug-war-insur-
gency (Accessed: 29 July, 2011). 
Deare, C. (2009). “US – Mexico Defence Relations: An In-
compatible Interface”, Strategic Forum, No. 243, pp. 
1-11.
Ellingwood, K. (2011). “Four Men Found Guilty in 2010 
killing of 15 at Mexico Teen Party”, The Los Ange-
les Times, Available at: http://www.latimes.com/
news/nationworld/world/la-fg-mexico-massa-
cre-20110708,0,922236.story (Accessed: 28 July, 
2011).
Ellingwood, K. and Wilkinson, T. (2009). “Drug Car-
tels’ New Weaponry Means War”, The Los Angeles 
Times. Available at: http://www.latimes.com/news/
nationworld/world/la-fg-mexico-arms-race15-
2009mar15,0,229992.story (Accessed: 29 July, 2011).
Fantz, A. (2012). “The Mexico Drug War: Bodies for 
Billions”, CNN. Available at: http://edition.cnn.
com/2012/01/15/world/mexico-drug-war-essay/
index.html?hpt=hp_c2 (Accessed: 14 January, 
2012). 
Feiling, T. (2009). The Candy Machine: How Cocaine 
Took Over the World, London, Penguin Books.
Finnegan, W. (2010). “Silver or Lead”, The New Yor-
ker. Available at: http://www.newyorker.com/
reporting/2010/05/31/100531fa_fact_finnegan 
(Accessed: 14 January, 2012). 
Freeman, L. C. (2004). The Development of Social Net-
work Analysis: A Study in the Sociology of Science, 
Vancouver, Empirical Press.
Horwitz, S. (2011). “A Gunrunning Sting Gone Fa-
tally Wrong”, The Washington Post. Avail-
able at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/
investigations/us-anti-gunrunning-effort-turns-
fatally-wrong/2011/07/14/gIQAH5d6YI_story.html 
(Accessed: 13 January, 2012).
Isacson, A. (2010). “Don’t Call It a Model”, Washington 
Office on Latin America. Available at: http://justf.
org/files/pubs/notmodel.pdf  (Accessed: 13 Janu-
ary, 2012).
International Crisis Group (2008). “Latin American Drugs 
I: Losing the Fight”, Latin America Report No. 25.
Keen, D. (2008). Complex Emergencies, Cambridge, Pol-
ity.
Kenney, M. (2009). “Turning to the ‘Dark Side’: Coordina-
tion, Exchange and Learning in Criminal Networks”, 
in M. Kahler (ed.), Networked Politics: Agency, Pow-
er and Governance, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
Killebrew, R. and Bernal, J. (2010). “Crime Wars: Gangs, 
Cartels and US National Security”,  Centre for a New 
American Security. Available at: http://www.cnas.
org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Crime-
Wars_KillebrewBernal.pdf (Accessed: 13 January, 
2012).
Lupsha, P. A. (1991). “Drug Lords and Narco-corruption: 
The Players Change but the Game Continues”, 
Crime, Law and Social Change, Vol. 16, pp. 41-58.
Manwaring, M.G. (2009). “State and Nonstate Associat-
ed Gangs: Credible ‘Midwives of New Social Order’”, 
Strategic Studies Institute, SSI. Available at: http://
www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/sum-
mary.cfm?q=876 (Accessed: 14 January, 2012).
McKinley Jr., J. C. (2006). “Mexican Court Rejects Elec-
tion Fraud Charges”, The New York Times. Available 
at: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/28/world/
americas/28cnd-mexico.html?hp&ex=1156824000
&en=febdbcc5e379a14f&ei=5094&partner=home
page (Accessed: 29 July, 2011).
Münkler, H. (2005). The New Wars, Cambridge, Polity.
Passas, N. (2000). “Global Anomie, Dysnomie, and Eco-
nomic Crime: Hidden Consequences of Neoliber-
alism and Globalization in Russia and Around the 
World”, Social Justice, 27, (2) pp. 16-44.
Poiré, A. (2011). Public Lecture at the London School of 
Economics. See http://www2.lse.ac.uk/newsAnd-
Media/videoAndAudio/channels/publicLecture-
sAndEvents/player.aspx?id=964 (Accessed: 27 July, 
2011).
Reuter, P. (2009). “Systemic Violence in Drug Markets”, 
Crime, Law and Social Change, 52, pp. 275-284.
Rice, A. (2011). “Life on the Line”, The New York Times 
Magazine. Available at: http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/07/31/magazine/life-on-the-line-be-
tween-el-paso-and-juarez.html?pagewanted=all 
(Accessed: 14 January 2012). 
Robb, J. (2007). Brave New War, Hoboken, Wiley & Sons.
Interdisciplinary Political Studies
Vol.2, No. 1 Special issue, March 2012
©IdPS
47
ISSN 2039-8573 online
Snyder, R. and Duran-Martinez A. (2009). “Does Illegality 
Breed Violence? Drug Trafficking and State-Spon-
sored Protection Rackets”, Crime, Law and Social 
Change, vol. 52, pp. 253-273.
UNODC (2011). United Nations World Drug Report, Unit-
ed Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Available at: 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-anal-
ysis/WDR2011/World_Drug_Report_2011_ebook.
pdf (Accessed: 14 January, 2012). 
US Army (2006). “Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency 
Operations”. Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/
doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf (Accessed: 14 January, 
2012). 
US Department of Justice (2010). “National Drug Threat 
Assessment 2010”, Executive Summary, accessed 
from http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs38/38661/
execSum.htm#Top on 29 July 2011.
GAO (2010). “Mérida Initiative: The United States Has 
Provided Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support 
But Needs Better Performance Measures”, US Gov-
ernment Accountability Office, GAO-10-837. Avail-
able at: http://gao.gov/assets/310/307523.pdf (Ac-
cessed: 15 January, 2012).
Vulliamy, E. (2010). “La Violencia”, Guernica. Available at: 
http://www.guernicamag.com/features/2135/vul-
liamy_11_1_10/ (Accessed: 14 January, 2012). 
Williams, P. (2011). “Criminal Violence in Mexico—a Dis-
senting Analysis”, in R.J. Bunker, Narcos Over the 
Border, New York, Routledge, 
Williams, P. (2009). “Drug Trafficking, Violence and the 
State in Mexico”, Strategic Studies Institute, SSI. 
Available at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.
army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=913 (Accessed: 
14 January, 2012).
